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A cross-sectional study was conducted in backyard poultry flocks among nine 
counties of Maryland from May 2011 to August 2011.  The objective of this study 
was to obtain baseline data from a survey on biosecurity practices and investigate risk 
factors associated with positive findings of avian influenza (AI), Newcastle disease 
(ND), infectious laryngotracheitis (ILT), Mycoplasma gallisepticum (MG), and 
Salmonella Enteritidis (SE).  Serum, tracheal, and cloacal swabs were randomly 
collected from 262 birds among 39 registered premises.  Analysis revealed flock 
prevalence and seroprevalence respectively for the following:  AI (0%, 23%), ND 
(0%, 23%), ILT (26%, 49%), MG (3%, 13%), SE (0%, ND).  Vaccine status could 
not be confirmed for ND, ILT, or MG.  Premises positives were identified by partial 
nucleotide sequencing.  No statistically significant associations were identified, 
however, AI seroprevalence was positively associated with exposure to waterfowl 
(Relative Risk [RR] = 3.14, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.1-8.9) and absence of pest 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Rationale and Objectives 
 
Poultry diseases can have major implications on a country’s economy, food 
source, and public health.  With recent concern over the highly pathogenic avian 
influenza outbreaks around the world, government agencies are carefully monitoring and 
inspecting for infectious poultry diseases and zoonotic pathogens.  However, there 
remains no organized inspection or control of non-commercial poultry flocks which have 
served as the point source of several poultry disease outbreaks.  At present, only a few 
studies have evaluated the prevalence of disease in backyard flocks.  These factors among 
others contribute to the need for ongoing surveillance research to minimize the costs 
associated with quarantines, depopulation, and loss of production time which radiate 
beyond the affected premises.  Even more significant are the impacts felt by immediate 
trade bans and export restrictions levied upon countries infected with diseases such as 
avian influenza or exotic Newcastle disease.  The Delmarva region, a peninsula 
consisting of portions of Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, is of particular concern due 
to its previous experiences with avian disease outbreaks.  Delmarva has a densely 
populated poultry industry in close proximity to infamous live bird markets of the 
northeast, which have been susceptible to avian influenza in the past.  This region is also 
located within the path of a major migratory flyway providing a means for disease 
reservoirs to travel across large geographical areas. Throughout their migration, infected 
birds may congregate with other wild and domestic species leading to further 




  The ultimate goal of this study was to identify and understand potential 
transmission pathways of pathogens of economic and public health importance by 
conducting a cross-sectional molecular epidemiological study.  Disease prevalence results 
were correlated with respect to biosecurity measures practiced among non-commercial 
poultry operations in Maryland.  This research plan aimed to achieve seven major 
objectives.   
1. Characterize Maryland non-commercial poultry flock owners and describe 
currently practiced biosecurity measures, obtained from self-administered 
questionnaire data.  
2. Indentify seroprevalence and vaccination status of pathogens under investigation 
including avian influenza virus (AIV), Newcastle disease virus (NDV), infectious 
laryngotracheitis virus (ILTV), and Mycoplasma gallisepticum (MG) using 
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA).  
3. Determine prevalence of pathogens by flock status for avian influenza virus 
(AIV), Newcastle disease virus (NDV), infectious laryngotracheitis virus (ILTV), 
Mycoplasma gallisepticum (MG), and Salmonella Enteritidis using Quantitative 
Polymerase Chain Reaction (q-PCR) and Quantitative Reverse Transcription 
Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-qPCR).   
4. Identify and differentiate strains from PCR positive flocks through nucleotide 
sequencing. 
5. Test for the presence of antibodies to influenza A H5, H7, and H9 subtypes in a 




6. Evaluate statistically significant biosecurity risk factors used in small flocks that 
may be associated with disease status.  
7. Develop online eXtension educational programs on practical and effective 
methods of preventing and mitigating poultry disease outbreaks in non-
commercial poultry flocks.    
 
1.2 Literature Review 
  
 The poultry pathogens of particular concern in this study include avian influenza 
virus, Newcastle disease virus, infectious laryngotracheitis virus, Mycoplasma 
gallisepticum, and Salmonella Enteritidis.  These pathogens are capable of causing 
substantial morbidity and mortality in poultry and/or humans and are reportable to 
national and/or international agencies (Table 1). 
 
Table 1  Description of OIE reportable poultry diseases 
 
Disease Type of Agent Natural Hosts Mortality Rate Clinical Signs 
Avian Influenza 
(AI) 







Highly pathogenic  
90-100% 
Severe respiratory disease, edema, cyanosis, 
decreased egg production 
Low pathogenic  10-
20% 
mild respiratory disease, ruffled feathers, 











Dyspnea, edema, diarrhea, neurological 




Severe respiratory disease and neurological 
signs, decreased egg production 
Mesogenic ND <10% acute respiratory disease, decrease egg production, occasionally neurologic signs 























Rales, coughing, nasal discharge, 





1.2.1 Avian Influenza 
  
 Avian influenza (AI) is caused by type A influenza virus which has a segmented 
genome of eight negatively sensed, single stranded, RNA particles encoding 11 to 12 
proteins, totaling 13.5 kb in length.  Type A influenza viruses are categorized into 
serological subtypes based on surface glycoproteins, hemagglutinin (HA) and 
neuraminidase (NA).  Host tropism is highly dependent on HA as it binds to host cell 
receptors that contain terminal α-2,6 linked or α-2,3 linked sialic acid molecules. AI 
viruses preferentially bind to α-2,3 linked receptors of avian respiratory epithelium, while 
human influenza viruses have a higher affinity for  α-2,6 linked receptors of the upper 
respiratory tract.  Although human non-ciliated cuboidal bronchiolar and alveolar type II 
cells located in the lower respiratory tract contain α-2,3 linked receptors, infection with 
non-human adapted viruses is rare.  HA also consist of a cleavage site with varying 
amino acid sequences that determine the tissue tropism and disease severity (Figure 1) 
(Medina and Garcia-Sastre, 2011).  Currently, sixteen hemagglutinin and nine 
neuraminidase subtypes have been identified, with H5 and H7 often exhibiting the most 
virulence in poultry.  Most laboratories initially rely on the matrix protein for detection of 
AI as it is the most abundant protein and highly conserved in all influenza A viruses 









Figure 1  Avian Influenza virus genome and viral factors that influence pathogenesis 
(Medina and Garcia-Sastre, 2011) 
 
 
Influenza type A viruses are zoonotic pathogens capable of infecting a wide range 
of species.  Aquatic birds are the natural reservoir for influenza A viruses and can carry 
all 144 possible subtype combinations in their gastrointestinal tract, while human 
circulating strains affecting the respiratory tract are generally limited to H1N1, H2N2, 
and H3N2.  Poultry may also carry a variety of HA and NA subtypes, including: (HA 4, 
5, 7, 9, 10 and NA 1, 2, 4, 7), as well as H5N1 and H7N7 subtypes (Figure 2).  Despite 
producing large quantities of virus, waterfowl generally present with no clinical signs of 
illness.  However, infections in poultry and other incidental hosts may result in a wide 
variety of signs, further classifying the virus into highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(HPAI) or low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) (Causey and Edwards, 2008).  HPAI 




infected birds within 48 hours of exposure.  However, most strains are LPAI with signs 
of disease ranging from none, to ruffled feathers, decreased egg production, and mild 
respiratory distress.  Transmission occurs by direct contact with infected birds via their 
feces, saliva, or nasal secretions.  Indirect transmission may occur through contact with 
contaminated equipment, clothing, litter, or drinking water.   The primary route of 
infection is through oral ingestion, although conjunctival and respiratory routes are other 
potential means.  AI viruses can persist for over a month in water and feces at 40⁰F and 
have an incubation period of 3-14 days (McMullin, 2004).       
 
 










 Of primary concern is HPAI H5N1, which has resulted in the death of millions of 
birds around the world.  While endemic in some countries, it has not been detected in the 
U.S. and therefore commercial birds are generally not vaccinated.   Another alarming 
characteristic of HPAI H5N1virus is its ability to cross the species barrier and infect 
humans.  Influenza viruses are notorious for their ability to undergo antigenic drift and 
shift resulting in subtle or dramatic genotype changes respectively (Medina and Garcia-
Sastre, 2011). As of June 2011, there have been 606 confirmed cases of human infection 
and 357 deaths, killing approximately 60% of those infected (WHO, 2011).  While the 
virus is not easily transmitted from person to person, it results in an excessively high case 
fatality ratio making it a prime candidate for pandemic concern.  Throughout the last 
century, three pandemics of novel influenza virus origins have erupted, placing 
mortalities in the millions worldwide.  However, 2009 rang in the first influenza (H1N1) 
pandemic of the 21st century prompting animal and human health officials to remain 
attentive in monitoring and surveillance (WHO, 2009; CDC, 2005).  All HPAI and LPAI 
H5/H7 subtypes are immediately reported to state and federal agencies as well as the 
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) to help contain and eliminate the virus 
(USDA, 2007).       
 
1.2.2 Newcastle Disease  
 
 Newcastle disease (ND) is caused by the avian paramyxovirus type I (APMV-1) 
serotype of the genus Avulavirus belonging to the Paramyxoviridae family and consists 
of 15,186 nucleotides. There are nine serotypes of avian paramyxoviruses, APMV-1 to 




sense, enveloped RNA virus (Wakamatsu, 2007).  The six open reading frames of NDV 
code for seven proteins (Figure 3).  The hemagglutinin-neuraminidase glycoproteins bind 
to sialic acid cell surface receptors, triggering the fusion (F) protein to fuse the viral 
envelope to the host plasma membrane. Cleavage of the precursor glycoprotein F0 into 
F1 and F2 by host cell proteases is a requirement for viral infection.    The fusion gene 
has been of particular interest as its diversity has allowed for genetic characterization of 
NDV isolates.  The characterized amino acid sequence motifs at the F protein cleavage 
site are as follows:  Lentogenic 112G-R/K-Q-G-R↓L117, Mesogenic/Velogenic 112R/G/K-
R-Q/K-K/R-R↓F117 (Dortmans et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 3  Paramyxovirus genome structure and features of the F glycoprotein 







 In poultry, NDV causes an array of clinical signs from subclinical to acute 
mortality.  Signs vary depending on virus strain, host species, age of host, secondary 
infections, and stress.  Associated signs include respiratory distress, diarrhea, cessation of 
egg production, inactivity, edema of the head, face, and wattles, nervous signs, and death.  
Strains of NDV have been grouped into five pathotypes on the basis of the clinical signs 
seen in infected chickens.  Viscerotropic velogenic pathotype is a highly pathogenic form 
resulting in hemorrhagic intestinal lesions.  Neurotropic velogenic form presents with 
high death rate subsequent to respiratory and nervous signs.  Mesogenic pathotypes are 
characterized by respiratory and occasionally nervous signs and low mortality.  
Lentogenic forms present with mild or subclinical respiratory infection.  The final 
pathotype is asymptomatic enteric consisting of subclinical infection.  NDV is thought to 
primarily spread through inhalation of large droplets or via ingestion of infected feces 
which generally contain high viral loads.  Incubation period, on average, is five to six 
days (Alexander, 2008).  Prophylactic vaccination is practiced in all but a few of the 
countries that produce poultry on a commercial scale.  The widespread presence of 
lentogenic strains in wild birds and the use of these viruses for live vaccines make 
diagnosis of disease difficult.  Newcastle disease virus is also zoonotic and has been 
reported to cause eye infections in humans.  Virulent NDV is considered an OIE listed 
notifiable disease (OIE, 2010).   
 
1.2.3 Infectious Laryngotracheitis 
  
 Infectious laryngotracheitis (ILT) is a respiratory disease caused by Herpesviridae 




DNA virus and its genome is 155 kb in size composed of an unique long (UL) and a 
unique short (US) region that is flanked by inverted repeats (IR).  The ILTV genome has 
a total of 77 predicted open reading frames with 62 located in the UL region, nine in the 
US, and three in the IR (Ziemann et al., 1998) (Figure 4).  Several studies have used 
glycoprotein C (gC), one of the major surface antigens of ILTV, for detection due to its 
conserved sequence, while the variable infected cell protein 4 (ICP4) has been used to 
differentiate between strains (Callison et al., 2006 and Chacon et al., 2009).  Oldoni et al. 
have recently characterized circulating field strains by genotypes 1-6.  
 
 




 As with other herpes viruses, ILTV has the ability to establish latent infections in 
the trigeminal ganglion, causing clinically inapparent infection which can persist in 
recovered birds for long periods with intermittent re-excretion of the virus.  Incubation 
period is generally 6-12 days (Johnson et al., 2004).  In areas with endemic disease, such 
as the U.S., ILT is controlled in layers with the use of modified-live virus vaccines such 




shown that 63% of field isolates from commercial farms were similar to CEO vaccine 
strains.  Providing further evidence of their ability to revert to virulence, non- attenuated 
CEO-related isolates can persist within naive backyard and fancier chicken flocks (Guy 
and Garcia, 2008).   
 ILT is primarily a disease of chickens; however, it may also affect pheasants, 
partridges, and peafowl.  In chicken flocks, ILTV transmission occurs via respiratory and 
ocular routes. This virus presents clinically in three different forms: peracute, subacute, 
and chronic/mild. The peracute form produces the most sudden and severe cases of 
disease. The mortality rate may be over 50% with some deaths occurring prior to 
development of signs.  Characteristics of the peracute form include anorexia, depression, 
and severe respiratory distress with coughing, gurgling, and rales. The neck is often 
extended upon inspiration as the trachea becomes partially occluded by bloody mucus 
exudate.  In the subacute form, the onset of illness is slower and respiratory signs may be 
seen in the days prior to death.  The mortality is lower than in the peracute form (between 
10% and 30%), and signs of illness less severe, ranging from lacrimation, tracheitis, 
conjunctivitis, and mild rales.  Chronic or mild ILT illness may involve spasms of 
coughing and gasping, nasal and oral discharge, and reduced egg production.  ILT is 
notifiable to local, state, and federal agencies, as well as to OIE (OIE, 2010).  
 
1.2.4 Mycoplasma Gallisepticum 
  
 Mycoplasma gallisepticum (MG) is a gram negative, coccoid, facultative 
anaerobe (0.25-0.5um) belonging to the family Mycoplasmataceae and is the most 




and represent the smallest replicating organism.  MG contains approximately 200 
polypeptides in its plasma membrane which provide surface antigenic variation, 
adhesion, motility, nutrient transport and methods of immune evasion.  MG targets sialic 
acid residues of the respiratory epithelium to initiate cytadherence and infection and has 
been known to survive intracellularly (Papazisis et al., 2000).  PvpA, an integral 
membrane protein, has been used to identify sequence variations among strains as a result 
of its high frequency phase variation and size discrepancies ranging from 48 - 55kDa 
(Boguslavsky et al., 2000).     
  Mycoplasma gallisepticum is the etiological agent of chronic respiratory disease 
in chickens characterized by severe airsacculitis, coughing, rales, and poor growth. In 
turkeys and other game birds, swollen sinuses are commonly seen along with decreased 
meat and egg production.  The severity of disease is greatly enhanced through stress and 
secondary respiratory pathogens (OIE, 2010).  In poultry, the route of infection is via the 
conjunctiva or upper respiratory tract with an incubation period of 6-10 days.  
Mycoplasma sp. may be transmitted vertically through infected eggs, or by direct contact 
with birds, exudates, aerosols, airborne dust and feathers, and to a lesser extent, fomites. 
Spread is slow between houses and pens suggesting that aerosols are not normally a 
major route of transmission.  However, fomites appear to be a significant factor in 
transmission between farms.  Recovered birds remain infected for life and may 
experience recurrent disease (McMullin, 2004).  While control of MG is widely 
maintained through biosecurity practices in breeding stock of turkey and chicken 
industries, U.S. layer flocks are considered endemic with disease occurring in over 50% 




such as the F strain, 6/85, and ts-11 (Evans et al., 2005).  Mycoplasmosis is an OIE 
reportable disease (OIE, 2010).     
 
1.2.5 Salmonella Enteritidis  
  
 Salmonella is the gram negative facultative anaerobe responsible for causing 
food-borne salmonellosis in humans (Pui et al., 2011).  Previous epidemiological studies 
report that up to 3.7 million cases of samonellosis occur in the U.S. every year, with 
economic losses to poultry farmers ranging from $64-144 million annually.  Salmonella 
serotype Enteritidis (SE) is one of the most prevalent serotypes of Salmonella bacteria 
reported globally.  Using the Colindale phage-typing scheme, 16 phages have been used 
to identify 65 phages types for SE.   Most types of Salmonella survive in the intestinal 
tracts of birds, but generally do not cause clinical illness (Omwandho and Kabota, 2010).  
Although this serotype has been found in chicken meat, shell eggs are usually 
considered the most common vehicle for transmission of SE as human infection is 
typically acquired after consuming undercooked contaminated eggs.  Signs and 
symptoms of salmonellosis include fever, abdominal cramps, and diarrhea lasting 4 to 7 
days.  Eggs become contaminated with SE by penetrating cracks in the shell.  Vertical 
transmission has also been implicated as the bacterium can silently infect the ovaries of 
healthy appearing hens and enter the egg prior to shell formation.  Despite the fact that 
birds may be originally purchased as culture-negative chicks, SE has been isolated from 
insect and animal hosts living in and around hen houses.   It is estimated that one out of 
every 20,000 eggs is contaminated with SE, leaving a total of 2.2 million eggs 




nationwide increase of Salmonella Enteritidis isolates with pulse field gel electrophoresis 
(PFGE) pattern JEGX01.0004 were noted on PulseNet, a national subtyping network that 
tracks molecular surveillance of food borne infections.  In August 2010, 380 million eggs 
were recalled after being linked to the outbreak of Salmonella poisoning.  The CDC 
states that from May 1 to November 30, 2010 approximately 2,000 cases of Salmonella 
related to contaminated shell eggs were reported (CDC, 2010).  
 
1.3 Background 
1.3.1 Surveillance and Prevention Programs 
 
Monitoring and surveillance of poultry diseases are essential components to early 
detection, prevention, and mitigation of potential outbreaks in the United States and 
around the world.  The diseases of interest within this study can cause significant 
consequences to trade markets, animal and public health, as well as food security and are 
therefore monitored through cooperative programs involving industry, state and federal 
agencies, as well as international organizations.  Domestically, individual state 
Departments of Agriculture as well as the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) are responsible for 
conducting disease surveillance programs among distinct bird populations including live 
bird markets, commercial flocks, migratory birds, and to a lesser extent, backyard 
poultry.  While USDA surveys for all of the diseases included in this study, additional 
authorities may be involved as well. In an effort to prevent the introduction of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) into the country,  USDA, along with the Departments 




play important roles in surveillance, quarantine, enforcement of trade restrictions and 
interception of smuggled birds or bird products (USDA, 2007a).   Salmonella on the other 
hand falls under the jurisdiction of USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) surveillance.  While USDA is responsible for the 
safety of meat, poultry, and processed poultry products, FDA conducts inspections of 
shelled eggs and production facilities (FDA, 2009).  
There are also several international agencies that play a role in early warning and 
response to pathogens that could have considerable impact on animal and public health.  
The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) provides global oversight and 
protection from the spread of reportable animal diseases by integrating animal health 
information from countries worldwide.  By declaring disease status to OIE, a country 
gains the trust of neighboring and international trade partners.  OIE’s World Animal 
Health Information Database (WAHID) also provides online access to comprehensive 
information of disease status by country (www.oie.int/wahis/public.php).  All of the 
diseases, except for Salmonella Enteritidis, are considered OIE reportable diseases.  The 
United States has been no exception to OIE reportable diseases and has experienced 
several positive cases within the last decade (Table 2). 
 There are four methods of surveillance employed during domestic poultry 
monitoring including passive, active observational, active serologic, and active antigen 
surveillance, each targeting various flock subpopulations.  While passive surveillance 
relies on voluntary reporting of clinical disease, active observational surveillance keeps a 
cognizant watch for morbidity and mortality.  Serologic surveillance involves collecting 




disease.  However, measurable antibody levels may take a week or more to develop after 
exposure.  Antigen detection is also used to determine infection status, but is limited to 


























































































































































































































Currently in the U.S., much of the poultry disease surveillance is initiated at the 
industry level, where poultry companies often employ their own veterinary staff and in-
house diagnostic laboratory.  Commercial poultry surveillance methods are generally 
considered sensitive and thorough.  For example, using only an active observational 
surveillance approach, it has been predicted with 95% probability that large-volume 
industries would identify an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza within two 
weeks from the flock’s first exposure.  While commercial industries undergo stringent 
biosecurity regulations and routine inspections, non-commercial flocks do not and may 
therefore be more vulnerable to pathogen exposure from wild animals and lax biosecurity 
practices.  Other studies, such as the USDA National Avian Influenza Surveillance Plan, 
have reported a similar conclusion, signifying the need for non-commercial surveillance 
(USDA, 2007b).   
 Ownership of backyard poultry is also becoming a fast growing trend for many 
Americans as more and more people prefer fresh eggs and meat.  However, these small 
poultry flocks present a unique challenge to surveillance as they are a diverse community 
with varying education and management practices.  While USDA provides biosecurity 
education, it does not regulate private small flocks and some states do not require poultry 
registration.  Historically, monitoring of backyard flocks has relied on passive 
surveillance from voluntary reporting of dead birds to Extension agents, private 
veterinarians, or state animal health diagnostic laboratories.  While some owners would 
certainly notify authorities in the event of increased mortalities, others may dismiss the 
occurrence and dispose of carcasses without further action, thus allowing the disease to 




Maryland, have begun taking an active approach to surveillance by requiring registration 
and testing of flocks prior to participating in fair or auction markets, operating hatcheries, 
or selling local eggs or poultry.  However, this population only accounts for a small 
percentage of owners.  In 2005, USDA surveyed the reasons for having birds among 
backyard flock owners and reported that only 11.2% of owners ranked these combined 
categories (extra income and clubs/social interactions e.g. 4H/avian organizations) as 
high and very high importance (USDA, 2005).          
 
1.3.2 Poultry Industry 
 
 The United States is the world’s largest producer and exporter of poultry meat and 
the second largest egg producer with almost 18 percent of total poultry production being 
exported. According to 2011 USDA statistics, U.S. broiler and turkey meat production 
totaled over 43 billion pounds while egg operations produced over 91.9 billion eggs 
annually, valuing the whole U.S. poultry industry at over $35.6 billion a year (USDA, 
2012).  Majority of the revenue stems from broiler operations concentrated in the mid to 
southeastern corner of the U.S. including the Delmarva region with over 1,500 registered 
broiler producers.  In 2011, Maryland ranked eighth in the nation for state broiler 
production, valued at over $690 million with 5 counties leading in U.S. broiler 
production.  According to 2010 Delmarva Poultry Industry data, Somerset ranked 25th, 
Worcester 26th, Wicomico 36th, Caroline 40th, and Dorchester 63rd among all counties 
in the nation (DPI, 2010).  Therefore, prevention measures and surveillance are necessary 
to protect the health of U.S. poultry flocks, minimize economic effects of the disease, and 




1.3.3 Delmarva  
  
 Delmarva and the Chesapeake Bay area are zones of interest when it comes to 
bird surveillance due to its high prevalence of migratory birds and poultry operations.  
The Delmarva Peninsula is known to coincide with the last major convergence point of 
the Atlantic Migratory Flyway serving waterfowl from the far reaches of the Arctic 
Ocean, Northwest Territory of Canada, and Greenland (Friend et al., 1999) (Figure 5).  
Other non-waterfowl species may share the same migratory pathways to and from their 
wintering grounds, increasing the potential for disease transmission and dissemination 
among the 1,500 plus domestic poultry operations in the Delmarva vicinity. 
 
Figure 5 Atlantic Migratory Flyway followed by North American Waterfowl.  






The potential for future outbreaks can be seen by examining Delmarva and 
bordering states' avian disease history within the last 30 years.  From 1998 - 2000, 
Delmarva poultry experienced an outbreak of infectious laryngotracheitis resulting in $4 
million in losses due to response and recovery efforts as well as lost production time 
(Ritter, 2000).  The 1999 outbreak of Mycoplasma gallisepticum in North Carolina also 
affected Delmarva broiler producers and a layer facility with one million birds as it was 
discovered that MG infected eggs from a North Carolina broiler breeder flock were 
shipped, hatched and grown in Delmarva (Dohms, 2000).  Even more alarming are the 
previous reports of avian influenza in and around Delmarva.  During 1983, commercial 
poultry operations in Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland and New Jersey experienced an 
outbreak of HPAI H5N2.  As a result, 17 million birds were euthanized and damages 
totaled $65 million (Panigrahy et al., 2002).  Had the Delmarva industry as a whole been 
affected, the predicted economic impact would have cost over $360 million accounting 
for the number of birds destroyed and equivalent production time lost (Musser and 
Mallinson, 1996).  In 2004, Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania were found to have 
flocks positive for LPAI.  Delaware and Maryland poultry cases were identified as H7N2, 
while the Pennsylvania layer flock subtype was H2N2.  This event led to the culling of 
400,000 chickens (CEI VS, 2004).  In 1998, a survey of free flying resident ducks on the 
Eastern Shore of Maryland revealed that almost 14% of the sampled population was 
positive for AI, representing nine different HA-NA combinations (Slemons, 2003).   
Another study reported that shorebirds migrating through the Delaware Bay had the 




flyway (Hanson, 2003). This further establishes the fact that the Delmarva region should 
maintain vigilant observation of surrounding non-commercial poultry. 
 
1.3.4 History of Backyard Poultry Outbreaks 
  
 Epidemiological investigations have found several devastating poultry disease 
outbreaks originating from backyard flocks.  In 1983, the outbreak of highly pathogenic 
H5N2 avian influenza (AI) in commercial poultry industries of Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
and New Jersey was attributed to traffic of contaminated workers, vehicles, and 
equipment associated with live bird markets in New York, which usually have an 
affiliation with backyard flocks (Beard, 2000).  Exotic Newcastle Disease has been 
diagnosed in U.S. backyard game fowl on three occasions in 1975, 1998, and again in 
2002-2003.  The 2002 outbreak emerged in southern California where more than 149,000 
birds in 2,671 premises were culled to stamp out the disease.  Despite the efforts, the 
disease spread to 21 commercial egg laying flocks containing over 3 million birds.  The 
virus continued to spread to Nevada and Arizona and was suspected to be the result of the 
mobility of backyard flocks and the lack of reporting for fear of quarantine or destruction 
(Kinde et al., 2003).  Johnson et al. also determined that in the 1998 Delmarva outbreak 
of infectious laryngotracheitis, case flocks were 36 times more likely to be stationed 
within a one mile radius of backyard flocks compared to controls, implicating backyard 
poultry as a potential source of transmission.  Other studies have found evidence that 
asymptomatic backyard flocks may be sources of Mycoplasma gallisepticum infection in 







 Biosecurity consists of the cumulative measures used to prevent the introduction 
of disease-causing organisms into a flock and to prevent the transmission of diseases 
within an infected area to nearby locations.  Biosecurity can reduce the risk of 
introducing disease and serves as an important determinant for the health of a flock 
(Shane, 1993; Nespeca et al., 1997). Transmission of avian influenza (AI) viruses through 
trade of infected poultry and contaminated equipment is considered one of the main 
means of spread.  Exposure to migratory birds has also been implicated as vectors for 
transmitting highly pathogenic H5N1 AI viruses (Sims et al., 2005).  The USDA 
recommends the following practices to prevent disease in their Biosecurity for the Birds 
program:  keep your distance, keep it clean, don't haul disease home, don't borrow disease 
from your neighbor, know the warning signs of infectious bird diseases, and report sick 














Chapter 2: Materials and Methods 
 
 
2.1 Study Design and Population 
 
This study used a cross-sectional survey design and convenience sampling 
method to determine disease prevalence and associated biosecurity risk factors among 
Maryland non-commercial poultry operations.   Surveillance included active 
observational, active serologic, and active antigen methods.  In an effort to control the 
transmission of poultry diseases, some states in the U.S. require poultry owners to 
register their flocks with their state’s department of agriculture.  In 2005, the Maryland 
General Assembly passed this legislation into law.  As of June, 2011, there have been 
3,258 backyard flocks registered with the Maryland Department of Agriculture (MDA) 
(Figure 6).  In May 2011, the MDA confidentially mailed 1,000 informational letters and 
return postcards to poultry owners enrolled in the Maryland Poultry Registration 
Program.   Backyard flocks were defined using the NAHEMS "Poultry '04" guidelines as 
residences with fewer than 1,000 birds (other than pet birds or in addition to pet birds).   
Study sites were designated by counties within three regions of Maryland:  
Northern (Frederick & Carroll), Southern (St. Mary’s & Charles), and Eastern Shore 
(Caroline, Dorchester, Talbot, Wicomico, & Worcester).  County selection was based on 
their high proportion of registered backyard flock owners as well as their relative location 
to commercial industries and auction markets.  Approximately 50% of registered owners 
were contacted in Northern and Southern counties, while 100% of selected Eastern Shore 
counties were contacted.  If poultry owners wished to participate, they were asked to 




were eligible for the study if they lived within Maryland, owned domesticated fowl, and 
had a flock size fewer than 1,000.  Respondents were offered a free diagnostic health 
status report of their flock as an incentive to participate in the study.  Upon agreement to 
participate, owners were sent an information sheet and consent form providing further 
details of the study including the risks and benefits of participation (Appendix A).  It was 
made clear that disease positive/seropositive birds were to be reported by law to the 
MDA who would conduct an internal follow up investigation and respond appropriately. 
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to sample collection.  
This study was approved in accordance with the University of Maryland's Institutional 
Review Board (IRB #11-0335), Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (45 




































































































2.2 Biosecurity Questionnaire 
 
 A four page questionnaire, adapted from USDA Poultry 2010 and previous 
publication by Tablante et al. was created in order to determine biosecurity factors that 
may be associated with the health status of small flocks (USDA, 2010;  Tablante et al., 
2002).  Prior to implementation, the survey was reviewed by the thesis committee and the 
MDA for feedback and final modifications.  Each backyard flock owner, following initial 
correspondence, was sent a copy of the questionnaire as well as a link to an online 
version of the survey.  Participants were asked to self-report information on the number 
and species of poultry reared, presence of other animals, animal husbandry, opportunities 
for interaction between wild birds and poultry, farm biosecurity measures, and health 
status of poultry.  A copy of the survey can be found in Appendix B.   
 
2.3 Sample Sites 
Sites were sampled once from June 15th – August 25th, 2011 corresponding with 
USDA surveillance recommendations for highest seasonal AI prevalence in migrating 
shorebirds (USDA DOI, 2006).  A sample size of 246 birds was sufficient to obtain a 
confidence interval of 95% with a desired precision of +/- 5% when the estimated 
prevalence of diseases was 20%.   A total of 262 birds were sampled from 39 backyard 
premises (Table 3) (Figure 7).  Sampled poultry were various ages and species including 
227 chickens (Gallus domesticus), 16 turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo), 15 ducks (Anas 
platyrhynochos, Cairina moschata), two guinea fowl (Numida meleagris), and two 

































County  Birds Premises 
Northern MD 151 20 
Frederick 135 17 
Carroll 16 3 
   Southern MD 61 10 
St. Mary’s 33 6 
Charles 28 4 
Eastern Shore 50 9 
Caroline 6 1 
Dorchester 4 1 
Talbot 12 2 
Wicomico 25 4 
Worcester 3 1 




2.4 Sample Collection 
 
 
 Proper biosecurity measures were taken during sample collection to ensure 
disease transmission was minimized.  Personal protective equipment (PPE) comprised of 
gloves, boot covers, and coveralls were donned and doffed before and after sample 
collection from each backyard flock premises.  Equipment was cleaned with RelyOn® 
disinfectant or Clorox® wipes after sampling and used materials/PPE were bagged and 
left with the flock owners for proper disposal.  During sampling procedures, birds were 
gently restrained and samples obtained appropriately and quickly.  Specimen collection 
was performed once on each bird.  Swab samples collected from birds included two 
tracheal and one cloacal swab to determine current infection of screened diseases.  
Gallinaceous birds (chickens, turkeys, quail) had both tracheal and cloacal swabs taken, 
while Anseriformes (ducks) only had cloacal specimens collected as the upper respiratory 
pathogens (ILTV and MG are not commonly isolated in these species). Blood was also 
drawn from each bird and serum processed for the presence of antibodies to establish 
previous exposure.  Environmental swabs were collected for the prevalence of 
Salmonella Enteritidis.   
 Polyester swabs with plastic handles were used for the collection of swab 
specimens as swabs with wooden handles may be treated with substances (formalin) that 
can inactivate live virus and inhibit the isolation of viral nucleic acid (Johnson, 1990).  
Different sized swabs (adult and pediatric) were used for large and small bird species 
respectively, to avoid injuries. Tracheal swabbing was performed by gently securing the 
bird and opening the beak.  Upon viewing the epiglottis and trachea, the swab was 




trachea was swabbed along the back and sides.  Cloacal swabs were pre-wetted in 
transport media and collected by gently securing the bird and inserting the entire tip of a 
suitably sized swab into the cloaca.  The walls of the cloaca were swabbed in a circular 
motion until the swab was visibly coated with fecal material.   
 Tracheal and cloacal swabs were placed separately into vials containing 2.5ml of 
protein based brain-heart infusion (BHI) transport media.  The presence of protein in the 
transport media helps prevent the degradation of live virus during handling and transport.  
Antibiotics were not added as samples were processed for bacteria as well.  Samples from 
birds of the same species raised on the same farm were pooled together.  Pooled samples 
consisted of a maximum of either two tracheal swabs or two cloacal swabs.   The second 
tracheal swab was placed in Frey's medium for Mycoplasma culturing.  All tubes were 
labeled with date, species, sample type, and location.  Once samples were collected, they 
were stored in a cooler and chilled to 4⁰C for transport back to Avrum Gudelsky 
Veterinary Center, University of Maryland College Park (UMCP) for diagnostic analysis.  
 Blood was collected by sterile technique from the brachial (wing) vein of each 
bird using a 1-3 ml sterile disposable syringe with 23 gauge and 1 in. needle length.  Care 
was taken to minimize vein damage and blood loss.  Approximately 1-3 ml of blood were 
immediately transferred to a serum separator vacutainer and allowed to clot at 
environmental temperatures.  Samples were then placed in a cooler with ice packs for 
transport to UMCP.   
 Environmental sampling for Salmonella subsp. Enteritidis was performed using 
sterile drag swabs stored in double-strength skim milk.  Sterile gauze pads (3x3) were 




Atkinson, WI) with 15 ml of double strength skim milk.  Poultry housing and pen areas 
were sampled and pads returned to the storage bag.  Each bag was sealed and promptly 
stored at 4⁰C prior to culturing.     
 
 
2.5 Sample Processing. 
 
 
 Upon returning to UMCP, samples for bacterial culturing were placed on a shaker 
at 37⁰C.  Swab samples were immediately processed or kept at 4⁰C for no longer than 48 
hours before nucleic acid extraction.    Figure 8 illustrates the processing procedure for 
each sample type.   
 

















 Serum was separated from the clot by centrifugation at 1,000 to 1,300 x g for 10 
minutes in a swinging bucket centrifuge.  Serum was then pipetted into a sterile 1.5ml 
tube, labeled with an identification number, and stored at -20⁰C prior to ELISA testing.  
The Synbiotics Corporation generously provided the following USDA-licensed screening 
kits:  ProFLOK® AIV Plus, Flu DETECT® BE, ProFLOK® Plus  Newcastle Disease 
Virus, ProFLOK® Laryngotracheitis (LT)  and ProFLOK® Mg.  Turkey and duck 
conjugates were also provided.  For the ProFLOK® ELISA kits, chicken serum and 
reagents were brought to room temperature prior to setting the dilution plate.  Dilution 
plates were prepared by adding 300 ul of dilution buffer to each well of the 96 well 
plates, except for the positive and negative control wells.  Serum samples were vortexed 
and 6 ul added to each well to create a 1:50 dilution.  Positive and negative control serum 
were also prepared and added to plate.  Then 50ul of dilution buffer and 50ul of serum 
were added to the corresponding wells and incubated for 30 minutes at room temperature.  
Plates were then washed three times with 1x wash solution for three minutes.  After 
washing, diluted conjugate (1:100) was added to each well and incubated for 30 minutes 
at room temperature.   Test plates were then washed as previously described and then 
filled with 100ul of substrate solution for 15 minutes.  After 15 minutes, 100ul of 1x stop 
solution was added to each well.  Serum from turkey and duck were used following the 
same procedure with the respective species conjugate.  Plates were read using the 
ELX800 microplate reader (BIO-TEK instruments, INC., Winooski, VT) and ProFILE3 




 The Flu DETECT® BE kit is a sensitive and specific blocking ELISA designed to 
aid in the detection of Type A antibody to AIV in serum from multiple species. Serum 
samples and reagents were brought to room temperature prior to conducting the assay.  
75ul of BE Dilution Buffer was added to each sample test well, followed by 25ul of 
serum sample for a dilution of (1:4).  Next, 100ul of BE Positive Control and 100ul of 
Negative Control were added to designated wells.  Plates were mixed by gently tapping 
the side and incubated for 60 minutes at room temperature.  After incubation, the fluid 
was discarded and 100ul of diluted BE HRP Conjugate was added to all wells, mixed and 
incubated for 30 minutes.  Then fluid was discarded and wells filled with 350ul of diluted 
Wash Solution.  Plates were washed four more times.  After all residual liquid was 
removed,   100ul of ABTS Substrate was added to each well and incubated at room 
temperature.  After 15 minutes, 100ul of diluted Stop Solution was added to each well.  
Plates were read using the ELX800 microplate reader (BIO-TEK instruments, INC. 
Winooski, VT) and ProFILE3 software (Synbiotics Corp, Kansas City, MO).   
 
 
2.5.2 Hemagglutination Inhibition 
 
 Hemagglutination Inhibition (HI) assays were conducted on AI positive serum to 
determine previous exposure to influenza subtypes H5, H7, and H9 as they are known to 
infect both humans and birds.  The World Health Organization (WHO) also believes that 
they have the greatest pandemic potential (Sorrell, 2009).  Prior to conducting a HI assay, 
the following viruses had to be propagated (H5:  A/Mallard/PA/10218/84/H5N2) (H7: 
H7N3 WT P1 in MDCK supernatant) (H9: A/Quail/Arkansas/20209-1/93/H9N2).  




samples were pretreated with Receptor Destroying Enzyme (RDE) in a 1:3 dilution and 
incubated overnight in a 37⁰C water bath.  After 16 hours, RDE activity was stopped by 
heating the samples to 53⁰C for 45 minutes in the water bath.  Tubes were then brought to 
room temperature and made to a 1:10 dilution by adding 600ul of saline solution.  Next, 
96 well plates were labeled for serum samples across A1-A12 and 50ul of corresponding 
serum was added.  A plate for each hemagglutinin subtype was prepared.  Wells B1 -H12 
were filled with 25ul of Phosphate Buffered Saline (PBS).  Performing a serial 2x 
dilution, 25ul of serum from A1-A12 was mixed into the wells B through H, discarding 
25ul from the last mixed well.  Then 25ul of virus dilution containing 4 HAU/25ul was 
added to each well.  Plates were mixed by gently shaking and incubated for 15 minutes at 
room temperature, allowing antibodies (if present) to neutralize the virus.  Finally, 50ul 
of 0.5% chicken red blood cells (RBC) were added to each well and left for 30-45 
minutes.  Each plate contained positive and negative antibody wells and a RBC control.  
Wells were read HI negative if a diffuse sheet of agglutinated RBCs covered the bottom, 
indicating no antibody was present to prevent hemagglutination.  HI positive wells were 
considered positive if they produced a dot, indicating complete hemagglutination and 
therefore the presence of H5, H7, or H9 antibodies, respectively.       
 
2.5.3 DNA/RNA Purification 
  
 Tracheal and cloacal swab specimens were purified for DNA and RNA material.  
The swabs were removed from the BHI transport media by squeezing out the remaining 
sample fluid using forceps that were disinfected with 70% ethanol after each vial.  




pellet large debris and potential PCR inhibitors.  Supernatant was then withdrawn and 
placed into a clean tube.  Samples not used in the DNA/RNA purification procedure were 
placed in cryovials and stored at -80⁰C.  Freeze thaw cycles were avoided as much as 
possible to prevent degradation of viral or bacterial samples and their genomic material.         
 DNA samples were extracted using the Qiagen (Valencia, CA) QIAamp DNA 
Mini Kit following the protocols for DNA Purification from Blood or Body Fluids (Spin 
Protocol).  In a 1.5ml microcentrifuge tube, 20ul of proteinase K was added followed by 
200ul of sample.    Two hundred ul of Buffer AL was added to the sample, mixed, and 
incubated at 56⁰C for 10 minutes.  Then 200ul of 100% ethanol was added to the sample, 
mixed, and briefly centrifuged.  The mixture was transferred to a QIAamp Mini spin 
column and spun at 6,000 x g for one minute. The spin column was placed in a clean 2ml 
collection tube and 500ul of Buffer AW1 was added.  The column was centrifuged for 
one minute at 6,000 x g and filtrate discarded.  Then 500ul of Buffer AW2 was added and 
centrifuged at full speed (20,000 x g) for three minutes.  The spin column was placed in a 
clean 1.5ml tube and 200ul of Buffer AE was added.  The column was incubated at room 
temperature for one minute and then spun at 6,000 x g for one minute.  The column was 
discarded and the tubes were labeled and kept at -20 ⁰C awaiting qPCR analysis.      
 The organic method was chosen for RNA extraction as it leads to high yields of 
RNA and is the preferred method for cloacal swab samples.  Two hundred and fifty ul of 
field sample supernatant was added to a 1.5ml tube.  Then, 750ul of TRIzol® (Invitrogen, 
Carlsbad, CA) was added and vortexed to deactivate RNases, while maintaining the 
stability of RNA.  After mixing, 200ul of chloroform was added and the tubes were 




Following incubation, the tubes were centrifuged for 15 minutes at 12,000 x g.  The 
upper aqueous phase containing RNA was transferred to a new tube while avoiding the 
interphase and organic phases of the mixture as they contain DNA and proteins that can 
decrease RNA yield and inhibit RT-qPCR reactions.  Then 500ul of isopropanol was 
added along with 1 ul of 5mg/ml stock glycogen to aid RNA precipitation.  Tubes were 
inverted several times and incubated at room temperature for 10 minutes.  Samples were 
spun at 12,000 x g for 10 minutes and fluid decanted.  One ml of 75% ethanol was added 
and gently mixed.  Mixtures were centrifuged at 10,000 x g for five minutes and ethanol 
decanted.  Tubes were inverted on paper towels to dry for 10-15 minutes.  After all 
ethanol had evaporated, 40ul of RNase free water was added.  RNA samples were stored 
at -80⁰C awaiting qRT-PCR analysis.   
 
2.5.4 qPCR and RT-qPCR  
 
 Quantitative PCR (qPCR) and Reverse Transcription Quantitative PCR (RT-
qPCR) were conducted on the Bio-Rad (Hercules, CA) CFX96 Real-Time thermal cycler 
and analyzed with CFX Manager Software.  Power SYBR® Green PCR Master Mix 
(Applied Biosystems, Carlsbad, California) was used in qPCR reactions to detect the 
presence of DNA from ILTV, MG, and SE in samples.  QuantiTect SYBR® green RT-
PCR kit (Qiagen, Valencia, CA) was used for one step RT-qPCR to ascertain positive 
complimentary DNA (cDNA) from AIV and NDV.  An internal control was included in 
each method to ensure extraction quality and confirm the fidelity of negative samples.  
All primers were taken from previous publications or designed using SeqMan and 




standard curve and thermal gradient analysis.  Each plate contained samples in duplicate 
as well as positive and negative controls.  All plate runs were followed with a melt curve 
analysis to confirm the absence of nonspecific amplification such as primer-dimer 
formation.   PCR positives were replicated twice.     
 Tracheal DNA swab samples were used for ILTV and MG qPCR analysis, while 
cloacal DNA swab samples were tested for SE. In preparation for amplification, a master 
mix containing 10ul of 1x Power SYBR Green PCR Master Mix, 0.5ul each of respective 
forward and reverse primers of 10uM concentration (IDT) (Table 4) were added to 
appropriate wells of a 96 well plate. Nine ul of sample DNA was then added for a total 
20ul PCR reaction.  Plates were sealed, gently mixed by rubbing the well bottoms, and 
spun at 1,000 rpm for 1 minute.  Once in the thermal cycler, samples were incubated at 
95⁰C for 10 minutes to activate the AmpliTaq Gold polymerase, followed by 40 cycles 
95⁰C at 15 seconds for denaturation and 60⁰C at one minute for annealing and extension.  
Samples were held at 4⁰C.   
 For gallinaceous poultry (chickens, turkey, quail, pheasant) tracheal RNA swab 
samples were used for AIV and NDV RT-qPCR analysis as these viruses primarily 
replicate in the respiratory tract.  For waterfowl, cloacal RNA swab samples were used as 
AI virus primarily replicates in the intestinal tract and NDV has been isolated most 
consistently from cloacal swabs  (Spackman and Suarez, 2008;Alexander, 2008).   
Samples and reagents were kept on ice while preparing the reaction master mix. A master 
mix was prepared in a sterile 1.5ml tube containing 10ul of 1x QuantiTect SYBR Green 
RT-PCR Master Mix, 0.5ul each of forward and reverse primers of 10uM concentration 




RNase inhibitor (13Units/ul) (RNasin, Promega).  After adding the master mix to the 96 
well plates, 6ul of sample RNA was added for a total reaction volume of 20ul. Plates 
were sealed, gently mixed by rubbing the well bottoms, and spun at 1,000 rpm for one 
minute.  Once in the thermal cycler, samples were incubated at 50⁰C for 30 minutes for 
reverse transcription, 95⁰C for 15 minutes to activate the HotStarTaq DNA polymerase 
followed by 40 cycles 94⁰C at 15 seconds for denaturation, 60⁰C at 30 seconds for 
annealing, and 72⁰C at 30 seconds for extension.  Samples were held at 4⁰C.   
 
 
Table 4  DNA qPCR primers for ILTV, MG, SE, and internal control 
Target Gene of Interest Amplicon Size 
Nucleotide 
Position Sequence (5' - 3') 
ILTV 
Glycoprotein C (gC) 

















chicken alpha2 (VI) 
collagen 







Table 5  RNA RT- qPCR primers for AIV, NDV, and internal control 
Target Gene of Interest Amplicon Size 
Nucleotide 








NDV Fusion (F) 158 bp 
240 CTTGGATGCATACAACAG   











2.5.5 Sequencing and Phylogenetic Analysis 
 
 Once quantitative PCR positives were confirmed, gene fragments were 
sequenced, aligned, and strain differentiated.  In order to differentiate between pathogen 
strains, a gene of lower conservation was selected.  Gene fragments were amplified using 
Platinum PCR SuperMix High Fidelity (Invitrogen, Grand Island, NY) on the Eppendorf 
Mastercycler (Hamberg, Germany).  In a 0.5ml tube, 38ul of SuperMix, 1ul of each 
forward and reverse primer of 10uM concentration (IDT) (Table 6), and 10ul of template 
DNA was added for a 50ul reaction.  Thermal cycler settings were 94⁰C at two minutes 
for enzyme activation, followed by 40 cycles of 94⁰C at 30 seconds for denaturation, 
55⁰C at 30 seconds for annealing, and 68⁰C at one minute per kilo-basepairs (kb) for 
extension.  Samples were held at 4⁰C until processed by gel electrophoresis on a 1% 
agarose gel at 100 volts for 40 minutes.  Appropriately sized bands of DNA were cut 
from the gel and purified using the QIAquick Gel Extraction Kit and protocol (Qiagen, 
Valencia, CA).   
 DNA then underwent modification sequence amplification using the previously 
described thermal cycler.  In a 0.5ml tube, 8ul of PCR product DNA, 2ul of BigDye, 4ul 
of 5x Buffer, 1ul of forward or reverse primer, and 5ul of distilled water was added.  
Thermal cycler settings were 96⁰C at four minutes, followed by 25 cycles of 96⁰C for 10 
seconds, 50⁰C for five seconds, and 60⁰C for four minutes.  Samples then underwent 
ethanol precipitation.  Two ul of 125mM EDTA and 60ul of absolute ethanol were added 
to the sample tubes and vortexed.  Samples were then centrifuged for 15 minutes at 
13,700 rpm and supernatant decanted.  Then 60ul of 70% ethanol was added, mixed, and 




completely dry.  Once moisture had evaporated, 10ul of Hidi Formamide (Applied 
Biosystems, Carlsbad, California) was added, and samples were loaded onto a 96 well 
sequencer plate.  Amplification product sequencing was done using the 3130 XL Genetic 
Analyzer (Applied Biosystems, Carlsbad, California).   Each amplification product was 
sequenced in both directions with overlapping forward and reverse primers (Table 6).   
 
Table 6  Sequencing primers for ILTV and MG PCR positives. 
Target Gene of Interest Amplicon Size 
Nucleotide 
Position Sequence (5' - 3') 
ILTV ICP4 
688 bp 
(Chacon et al., 2009) 
181 ACTGATAGCTTTTCGTACAGCACG 
869 CATCGGGACATTCTCCAGGTAGCA 
595 bp 640 CAGAGGACCAGCAAAGAC 1325 CTAACTGTTCCACTGGCATC 
MG pvpA 
702 bp 







 Assembly of sequence "contigs" and initial multiple-sequence alignments were 
performed with sequencing project management (SeqMan) and multiple-sequence 
alignment (MegAlign) programs, respectively (DNASTAR; Lasergene, Inc. Madison, 
WI).   Sequences were subjected to a Basic Local Alignment Search Tool (BLAST) 
database to find similar sequence matches using the Megablast nucleotide collection.  
Homologous sequences, including vaccine strains, were compared in a multiple 
alignment by ClustalW and single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) were used to 
differentiate positive field samples.  Alignment of protein sequences were compared for 
amino acid alterations which could potentially lead to changes in pathogen protein 
function.  Phylogenetic analysis was based on the neighbor-joining method using 
MEGA4 software (Tamura et al., 2007).  Bootstrap values in the phylogenetic tree were 




the tree:  USDA reference strain (JN542534.1), LT Blen® (JQ083493.2), Laryngo Vac. 
(JQ083494.2), 25/H/88/BCK (EU104899.1),  Brazil/2008/USP/07 (GQ499345.1), 
Brazil/2008/USP/62 (FJ477377.1), Brazil/2003/USP/15 (GQ499348.1), 
Brazil/2008/USP/80 (FJ794468.1), Brazil/2008/USP/74 (FJ794467.1), Jiang-2011-3 
(JN969100.1), 501/C/06/BR (EU104920.1),  7/B/99/BR (EU104919.1),  205/J/06/BR 
(EU104916.1),  63140/C/08/BR (JN542536.1),  288269/2007 (HM230781.1),  
305/K/05/BR (EU104913.1), 2/A/04/BR (EU104912.1),  417/A.06/BR (EU104914.1),  
20/F/04/BR (EU104915.1),  Peru/2008/USP-81 (FJ794469.1),  WangGang 
(DQ995291.1),  24/H/91/BCK (EU104910.1),  12/D/02/BCK (EU104911.1).   
         
 
2.5.6 Bacterial Propagation 
  
 National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) and Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) guidelines were followed for MG and SE isolation respectively.  Mycoplasma sp. 
isolated from tracheal swabs that had been kept in Frey's media with penicillin was 
incubated at 37⁰C for 4-5 days.  Cultures were then inoculated on a Frey's agar plate 
using a wire loop sterilized with a Bunsen burner.  Plates were incubated for 3-5 days at 
37⁰C in a high humidity incubator with 5% carbon dioxide.  Positive plates had tiny 
circular and translucent colonies 0.2-0.3 mm in diameter (Yoder, H 1980).  Viewing with 
a microscope showed the classic "fried egg" appearance with a central dense mass 
(CFSPH, 2007).   
 Salmonella sp. isolation was done from environmental drag swab samples.  One 




containing the environmental gauze pad and shaken vigorously for 30 seconds.  Bags 
containing the pre-enrichment media were kept in an open glass container and incubated 
for 24 hours at 37⁰C.  Afterwards, 1ml of incubated pre-enrichment fluid was transferred 
into 10ml of tetrathionate (TTH) broth and 0.1 ml of pre-enrichment fluid was transferred 
to 10ml of Rappaport-Vassilliadis (RV) medium.  TTH and RV broth were incubated at 
42.5⁰C in a water bath for 24 hours.  After incubation, a loopful of TTH was streaked 
onto brilliant green with novobiocin (BGN) and xylose lysine tergitol 4 (XLT4) agar 
plates.  This procedure was repeated for RV broth as well.  Plates were incubated for 24 
hours at 35⁰C.  Positive BGN plates had pink/white opaque colonies surrounded by red 
zones.  XLT4 positive plates had black colonies with a yellow periphery after 18-24 
hours of incubation (FDA, 2008).   
 
 2.5.7 Virus Propagation 
 
 Virus propagation was only attempted after obtaining positive PCR results as a 
form of secondary confirmation.  Positive AI controls were also propagated.  All viral 
propagating procedures were conducted in a biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) hood.  All viruses 
were thawed on ice from -80⁰C storage.  Inoculum was prepared using 100ul of sample 
and a 1:10 dilution of antibiotics (100x Pen-Strep -Amp).  For ILT sample propagation, 
USDA ILTV reference strain and Trachivax® were also included as positive controls.  
Using nine day old eggs, chicken embryos were inoculated via chorioallantoic membrane 
(CAM) and top route methods after candling to ensure embryo viability and location.  
CAM route procedure was conducted by disinfecting the egg and punching a hole on the 




membrane.  Then a hole was punched all the way through the shell to the air cell on top 
of the egg.  The egg was placed horizontally on a tray with the first hole facing up.  A 
three ml syringe and 18 gauge needle were inserted into the air cell to drop the CAM by 
gently pulling on the plunger.  After the CAM dropped, the inoculum in a one ml syringe 
and 25 gauge 5/8" needle was injected into the newly formed air cell. Both holes were 
sealed with Duco® cement (ITW Devcon, Danvers, MA).  Top route methods were 
performed in a similar manner, however, only one hole was punched a few cm above the 
air cell line and the inoculum was injected into the allantoic fluid (AF).   CAM route eggs 
were left on their side for 24 hours in a humidified incubator at 37⁰C.  Eggs were 
examined daily for dead embryos or until seven days post inoculation.  At this point, eggs 
were placed in 4⁰C for 3-4 hours prior to CAM extraction and visualization.  Viable virus 
produces white opaque plaques on the CAM.   
 Influenza virus positive controls were propagated via the top route method as 
previously described. However, eggs were placed in 4⁰C after 48 hours.  While eggs were 
in the refrigerator, a 96-well round bottom plate was prepared for the hemagglutinin 
assay (HA) by adding 50ul of PBS to each well.  After 3-4 hours, eggs were disinfected 
with 70% ethanol and the shell over the air cell was cracked and air cell membrane was 
removed.  The AF was aspirated and placed in a 15ml tube.  Then 50 ul of AF from each 
sample is added to the first well.  After mixing, 50ul was placed into the second well, 
continuing the process of a twofold serial dilution down the column of the plate and 
discarding 50ul from the last well.  Fifty ul of 0.5% chicken RBC was added to all wells.  
A positive, negative, and RBC control was used on each plate.  The plate was then 




virus prevented RBC agglutination.  Negative wells appear as a "dot," indicating virus 
was not present.   
 
 
2.6 Statistical Analysis 
 
Data collected from the survey was entered into a Microsoft Excel® database.  
Exposures were defined as lack of biosecurity practices listed throughout the survey and 
disease outcomes were assessed by ELISA and PCR screening tests.  The flock was the 
unit of interest for PCR and ELISA outcome analysis.  A flock positive status only 
required one bird to test positive.  After descriptive data analysis (mean, median, and 
range), univariate and multivariate statistical analyses were carried out.  The association 
of the independent variables elucidated from the questionnaire, such as biosecurity 
practices and the dependent variables (bird or flock disease positive) were analyzed using 
Fisher's exact test, (right sided) for the categorical variables (Table 7).  Disease status and 
independent variables of each flock were coded into a binary outcome (Disease=1, No 
disease=0) and (Exposed=1, Not exposed=0).  Strengths of associations were reported as 
relative risks or odds ratios.  Mean titers of normal distribution and equal variance were 
compared using two sample t-test. Other continuous variables were analyzed by simple 
logistic regression (Table 8).  A p-value < 0.25 was set as the inclusion threshold for 
categorical and continuous variables into multivariate analysis.  Multiple logistic 
regression containing all continuous and categorical variables with a p-value < 0.25 was 
executed for selection into a final stepwise backward elimination regression model. 
Variables with a p-value <0.05 were considered statistically significant for association 




for Windows v9.2 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC) and Statistix9 for Windows (Analytical 
Software, Tallahassee, FL).    
 
 
Table 7    Categorical variables examined for association with AI seropositive flocks. 
 
Biosecurity risk factor Description 
Mixed species (MIXSPCS) Chicken vs. other species 
Housing  (HOUSING) Free range vs. coop 
Species Separate (SPECSEP) Together vs. separate 
Owner exp wild waterfowl (OWNWFOWL) Exposed vs. not exposed 
Owner exp wild birds (OWNWDBRD) Exposed vs. not exposed 
Owner exp neighbor birds (OWNNEBRD) Exposed vs. not exposed 
Owner exp rodents (OWNRODNT) Exposed vs. not exposed 
Owner exp wild carnivore (OWNCARN) Exposed vs. not exposed 
Owner exp livestock  (OWNLVSTK) Exposed vs. not exposed 
Bird exp wild waterfowl (BRDWFOWL) Exposed vs. not exposed 
Bird exp wild birds (BRDWDBRD) Exposed vs. not exposed 
Bird exp pets (BRDPETS) Exposed vs. not exposed 
Bird exp rodents (BRDRODNT) Exposed vs. not exposed 
Bird exp wild carnivore (BRDCARN) Exposed vs. not exposed 
Bird exp livestock  (BRDLVSTK) Exposed vs. not exposed 
Allow visitors  (ALLVIS) Allow visitors vs. no visitors 
Isolate new birds  (ISONWBRD) No isolation vs. isolation 
Disease mortality  (DIESICK) Deaths vs. no deaths 
Diarrhea (DIARRHEA) Sick vs. not sick 
Respiratory disease (RESPDIS) Sick vs. not sick 
Neurologic disease  (NEURODIS) Sick vs. not sick 
Weight loss  (WGTLOSS) Sick vs. not sick 
Footbath/footwear (FOOTBATH) No footbath vs. footbath 
Clean and disinfect  (CLEAN) Don't clean vs. do clean 
Pest control   (PESTCON) No pest control vs. pest control 




Table 8    Continuous variables examined for association with AI seropositive flocks. 
 
Biosecurity risk factor Description 
Commercial farms   (COMMFARM) Number of farms within 1/4 mile 
Backyard farms   (BACKFLCK) Number of backyard flocks within 1/4 mile 
Years of ownership  (YEAROWN) Number of years kept poultry 
Flock size  (FLCKSZE) Number of birds in flock 
Visit commercial (VISCOMM) Number of times visit commercial farm (1yr) 









 Of the 1,000 mailed questionnaires, 41 (4.1%) were returned completed.  From 
the returned surveys it was determined that just over half (51.2%) of farms had chickens 
as the only species of domestic poultry.  The remaining farms had a mix of chickens and 
other domestic bird species, however, chickens accounted for 86.5% of the reported birds 
overall.  Surveyed flock size ranged from 3 to 901 birds with the median of 38 birds per 
flock (Table 9).  Fortyfour percent of surveyed owners have kept backyard poultry 
between 13 months and 5 years, while only 25.9% have had poultry over six years.  Of 
that population, only 1.5% have kept poultry over 10 years (Figure 9).  The predominant 
reason for keeping poultry was personal consumption of eggs (56.1%), followed by 
selling eggs (29.3%).  Other owners kept poultry for live sale (4.9%), as pets (4.9%), 
home consumption (2.4%), or to sell as meat (2.4%) (Figure 10).    
 Housing management for poultry was recorded as 39% cooped, fenced-in and 
covered, 17% cooped, fenced-in but not covered, 29.3% free-range, and 14.7% free-range 
near a water source such as ponds or streams.  Of the 20 backyard flocks with multiple 
species, only six owners (30%) keep them separate.  Owner and poultry exposure to other 
animals was variable.  Overall, 53.7% of poultry were reported accessible to wild birds 
while only 9.8% are exposed to waterfowl.  Personal interaction with livestock such as 
pigs, sheep, cattle, etc. was reported by 41.5% of owners while 31.7% of the poultry 
population was exposed to livestock (Figure 11).  Only five out of 41 (12.2%) farms 




being within a quarter mile of other backyard flocks.  In the average year, 10 owners 
visited commercial poultry sites 1 – 12 times (median = 7), with 3 coming in direct 
contact with birds. 
 In the average year, 10 owners also visited other backyard flocks 1 – 78 times 
(median = 7.5), with nine coming in direct contact with birds.  Only one owner did not 
allow visitors and of those who permitted guests, 73% allowed direct contact with birds.  
Only 5% (2/41) of owners sold birds at a market and 7.3% (3/41) bought birds from 
markets.  Within the last year, 83% of owners purchased new birds.  Of those who 
purchased birds, 17.6% did not isolate them before introduction into the flock.  Those 
who did isolate, on average, separated their new birds for 9-10 weeks with three owners 
keeping new birds separate indefinitely.   
 
 
Table 9  Backyard poultry species distribution and median flock size among the surveyed 








Overall Range a 
Number of Farms 20 12 9 41  
Median Flock Size  40 32 42 38  
Species:      
Chicken 2174 328 1173 3675 3- 901 
Turkey 216 8 35 259 0-210 
Duck 38 107 12 157 0-65 
Guinea Fowl 50 33 0 83 0-25 
Pheasants 0 33 0 33 0-30 
Geese 13 2 9 24 0-8 
Peacocks 4 6 0 10 0-6 
Chuckers 0 3 0 3 0-3 
Doves 3 0 0 3 0-3 
Total 2498 520 1229 4247  





Figure 9  Distribution of ownership time among backyard flock owners 
 
 














































 In regards to poultry health, only one owner out of 41 vaccinated their birds once 
they were on the premises.  In the previous two years, owners reported predation (57.1%) 
as having the highest cause-specific mortality rate followed by disease (30.2%), unknown 
(8.7%), and injury (4%).  Just over half (56%) of owners also reported observing signs of 
disease in their flock within the last six months. Almost one third of all owners recalled 
seeing birds with diarrhea (29.2%), while another 29.2% reported a decrease in egg 
production or soft/misshapen eggs.  A few reported respiratory disease (9.7%) such as 
coughing, sneezing, nasal secretions or swollen sinuses and 7.3% observed weight loss or 
decreased appetite in their flock.  Two owners reported neurological signs (4.87%) such 
as lack of coordination or weakness while no owners had birds with swelling of the head, 
comb, wattles, or hocks.  Six backyard flock owners (14.6%) reported that they have 




 For sanitation and decontamination, only three of the owners (7.3%) routinely use 
a footbath at the entrance to their poultry premises and two of the three also use dedicated 
footwear.  Of the remaining owners, 11 wear a different pair of shoes when entering their 
poultry area.  While the majority of owners (65.8%) always wash their hands before and 
after handling their birds, many (63.4%) never wear dedicated clothing (Table 10).  Over 
two thirds of owners clean and disinfect housing and equipment (68.3%) and all but one 
disposes of litter by means of composting (47.4%), setting in a manure pile (31.6%), 
spreading on field (18.4%), or having it hauled away (2.6%).  Dead birds were usually 
buried on site (43.6%), composted (20.5%), thrown in trash (15.4%), hauled away 
(10.25%), or fed to other animals (10.25%).  Pest control such as mouse traps or 
insecticides were used in 39% of backyard flock premises.        
 
Table 10  Frequency of biosecurity practices among flock owners 
 
Biosecurity Factor  Always  Sometimes  Never  
Hand washing  27/41 9/41 5/41 
Dedicated clothes  3/41 12/41 26/41 
Visitor wash hands  20/32 5/32 7/32 
Visitor clothes  4/32 1/32 27/32 
 
   
3.2 Seroprevalence of Avian Diseases   
 
 Thirty nine backyard poultry flocks were examined for previous exposure to 
NDV, ILTV, MG, and AIV (Table 11).  All serum samples, except those from pheasants 
and guinea fowl (n=4) were tested with the ND, ILT, and MG Enzyme-Linked 




species.  The determination of positive serum is interpreted from the serum sample to 
positive (SP) or negative (SN) (AI blocking ELISA) control ratio designated by the 
Synbiotics kit.  Of the 258 serum samples tested, 11.63% of birds were positive for 
antibodies to ND based on the SP value threshold of 0.151 or greater.   The seropositive 
chickens and turkeys originated from nine farms in three counties.  As no owners 
declared vaccinating their flocks for ND, hatcheries of origin were traced back and 
questioned.  Of the nine positive flocks, two owners obtained birds privately and no 
vaccination history could be obtained.  The remaining flocks originated from three out of 
state hatcheries, which vaccinate the breeder flock and started pullets for ND, however, 
chicks were only vaccinated for Marek's disease.  For the ILT ELISA, all duck and turkey 
serum tested negative and since chickens are the primary natural host, the ILT 
seroprevalence was calculated for chickens only.  Seroprevalence in this species was 
found to be 16.3% (37/227).  For greater specificity, the SP threshold was set to 0.276, 
compared to the kit standard of 0.151.  Seropositive chickens were located on 19 farms in 
six counties.  Only one backyard flock had been vaccinated for ILT.  Two owners 
received their poultry from commercial farms and three obtained their birds privately. 
The vaccination status of flocks originating from hatcheries is unknown, but is primarily 
done only when requested.   
 The MG ELISA kit divides antibody status into Negative (SP < 0.199), Probable 
(SP 0.2 -0.599), or Positive (SP > 0.6).  Of the 258 samples, 32 (12.4%) were considered 
probable, while 18 (6.98%) were positive.  A total of five farms from four counties had 
MG positive chickens and/or turkeys.  No owners vaccinated for MG and hatcheries 




farm. Based on the AI ELISA (SP > 0.35) and AI blocking ELISA (SN< 0.6), all 262 
samples were tested for antibodies to AI.   Vaccination for avian influenza in the U.S. 
requires USDA licensure and approval from both state and federal governments prior to 
field deployment and therefore is rarely practiced (Swayne and Akey, 2005).  
Seroprevalence of AI in backyard flock birds was 4.2% (11/262).  Chickens were the 
only species found positive from nine premises of four counties.  One bird from each 
premises was seropositive except one Frederick and one St. Mary's flock which had two 
seropositive birds.  HI tests did not detect H5, H7, or H9 subtype-specific antibodies 
among AI ELISA-positive sera.          
 
 
Table 11  ELISA antibody titers for ND, ILT, AI, and MG from backyard flocks in 
Maryland. 
 
 Number of birds with titer Total no. 
tested 
Positive threshold 
SP (titer) Disease <1000 1000-1999 2000-3999 >4000 
AI 7 2 2 0 262 SP > 0.35 (338
+) 
Blocking  SN < 0.6 
ND 5 1 6 18 258 SP > 0.151 (345+) 
ILT 75 21 6 12 258 SP > 0.276 (1,000+) 




3.3 Prevalence of Avian Diseases 
 
 Flock status for the presence of AIV, NDV, SE, ILTV, and MG was determined 
from swab samples using q-PCR.  Neither Influenza A nor Newcastle disease virus RNA 
was detected through RT-qPCR among the 262 paired tracheal/oropharyngeal or cloacal 
swabs collected from domestic poultry and waterfowl.  Salmonella Enteritidis DNA was 





2,000 bp     
of bird species, excluding ducks, were analyzed for ILTV and MG by qPCR.  Based on 
the paired swab results, 10 premises (25.6%) were found positive for ILT among three 
counties with all swab positives emerging from chickens (Figure 12).  One Frederick 
county flock with chickens and turkeys was positive for MG and was also one of the ILT 
positive flocks (Figure 13).  This flock of young poults presented with clinical respiratory 
disease as seen in the captured video footage (Madsen, 2011).   
 
Figure 12  Agarose gel electrophoresis of the ILT PCR positive flock isolates using the 
ICP4 primers.  Some flocks were positive by qPCR but not visible on gel.  Sequencing 
required a greater volume reaction not shown here.  Lanes are as follows: (1) 1 Kb 










Figure 13  Agarose gel electrophoresis of the MG S6 Flock PCR isolates using the pvpA 



































Table 12  Results of serological screening of 262 blood samples from 39 backyard flocks 
Disease Seropositive birds / total birds 
Seropositive flocks / 
total flocks 
Positive Flocks / 
total flocks 
AI 11/262 (4.2%) 9/39 (23.1%) 0 
ND a 30/258 (11.6%) 9/39 (23.1%) 0 
ILT a 37/227 (16.3%) 19/39 (48.7%) 10/39 (25.6%) 
MG a 18/258 (6.98%) 5/39 (12.8%) 1/39 (2.6%) 
SE N/D N/D 0 
 a Flock vaccination history could not be determined. 





Table 13  Flock seroprevalence and prevalence of diseases among the sampled counties 
in Maryland  
 
 Northern MD 
(n = 20) 
Southern MD 
(n = 10) 
Eastern Shore 




Mary's Charles Wicomico Talbot Caroline Dorchester Worcester 
Seroprevalence          
NDa 7/17  - - - 1/4 1/2 - - - 
ILTa 9b/17 2/3 3/6 1/4 3/4 1/2 - - - 
MGa 2/17 1/3 1/6 - - - - 1/1 - 
AI 6/17 1/3 1/6 - - - - 1/1 - 
          
Prevalence          
ND - - - - - - - - - 
ILT 6/17  - - 2/4 2/4 - - - - 
MG 1/17 - - - - - - - - 
AI - - - - - - - - - 
SE - - - - - - - - - 
 a Flock vaccination history could not be determined.   








Figure 14 Flowchart of ELISA and PCR positives for NDV, ILT, MG, and AI according 




3.4 Phylogenetic Analysis 
 
 A total of ten ILTV field isolates representative of each positive premises 
underwent partial nucleotide sequencing of the ICP4 gene for comparative genomic 
analysis.  The amplification product size ranged from consensus nucleotide positions 
240bp - 832bp.   Field sequences were compared to the genomic sequences of Gallid 
herpesvirus 1 (NC_006623.1), USDA reference strain (JN542534.1),  CEO LT BLEN® 
vaccine (JQ083493.2), CEO Trachivax® vaccine (Schering-Plough Animal Health, 
Millsboro, DE,USA), and TCO LT IVAX® vaccine (Schering-Plough, Animal Health, 
Millsboro, DE, USA) to identify single nucleotide polymorphisms and establish 
differentiation.  While accession numbers were identified in GenBank for the first three 




available and therefore sequenced and assembled with the field isolates.  Results showed 
a single flock having an identical match to the CEO LT BLEN®  vaccine while eight 
flocks had a 100%  match to the TCO LT IVAX® vaccine.  The remaining flock 
amplification product MD/ch151/11 (state/species/field#/year) is 98.5% identical to the 
LT BLEN® vaccine (Table 14).  At consensus nucleotide position 717bp the field isolate 
had nine sequential nucleotide insertions resulting in the addition of three serine amino 
acids (Figure14).  No identical matches could be located in published articles or in the 
BLAST database of GenBank.   To assess the integrity of the amplification product, 
additional overlapping primers were used to sequence the isolate.  The product revealed a 
consistent sequence from consensus nucleotide positions 697bp -1192bp.  According to 
Oldoni et al. (2008) genotype groupings, MD/ch151/11 would be classified as group V 
which is distinguished by CEO-related isolates.  Phylogenetic analysis compared the 
genomic similarity among vaccine and other ILTV strains isolated from the U.S., Italy, 
China, Peru, and Brazil published in GenBank (Figure 16).   
 The MD/ch151/11 ILT flock was also MG positive and again underwent sequence 
analysis using the pvpA gene to differentiate MG strains.  The amplification product size 
ranged from consensus nucleotide positions 586bp - 1041bp.   Field sequences were 
compared to the genomic sequences of strain R(high) (NC_017502.1), Strain F 
(NC_017502.1), ts-11 vaccine (AY556382.1), 6/85 vaccine (AY556308.1), S6 strain 
(AY556307.1), and strain A5969 (AY556305.1).  Evaluation of single nucleotide 
polymorphisms indicate that the MG positive flock was infected with the S6 strain with 























































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 16  Phylogenetic relations among ILTV strains including MD-ch151-11.  
Analysis was based on nucleotides 238-844 (606bp) of the ICP4 gene.  Bootstrap values 
from 1,000 replicates with neighbor-joining search method are indicated adjacent to the 


































































































































































































Figure 17  Map of Maryland flock distribution with swab positive backyard flocks.  











Figure 18  Map of Maryland flock distribution with seropositive birds.  Poultry industries 









3.5 Bacterial and Viral Propagation 
SE was not isolated from any of the environmental drag swabs; however, MG 
colonies did grow on Frey agar plate from the MG qPCR positive flock.   Colonies were 
evaluated with the Zeiss HAL 100 refracted light microscope using a 10x objective lens 
and AxioVision v4.8.2 software (Figure 19).  Attempts were made to isolate the 
unidentified ILTV strain after qPCR analysis, however, no plaques were observed on the 
sample's CAM.  The CAM was homogenized, extracted for DNA and evaluated by qPCR 
which also tested negative.  These outcomes are believed to be the result of viral and/or 
DNA degradation over time as sequencing and initial qPCR both confirm the presence of 
ILT virus. Earlier isolation attempts may have increased the potential to detect positive 
results.   
 
Figure 19   MG colonies grown on a Frey's medium agar from a qPCR MG positive 














3.6 Cross-sectional Associations 
Of the 39 flocks sampled, 36 also completed the survey and were analyzed for 
statistically significant associations.  As disease prevalence was low and vaccination 
status could not be accurately verified among several flocks, associations between 
dependent and independent variables were analyzed for AI seroprevalent farms only 
(9/36).   Farms that kept chickens as the only species were found to be significantly  
associated (p=0.041) with AI seroprevalent birds under univariate analysis, however, the 
association was no longer deemed significant after multivariate logistic regression when 
other variables were taken into consideration.  No other significant associations were 
identified by univariate or multivariate analysis.  However, some risk factors showed a 
positive association after relative risk calculations.   Relative risk measures the strength 
of an association and is the ratio of the probability of disease occurring in the exposed 
group versus a non-exposed group.  67% (2/3) of seropositive flocks were exposed to 
waterfowl compared to 21% (7/33) that were not exposed.  Seropositive flocks exposed 
to waterfowl were 3.14 times as likely to be AI seropositive than those not exposed to 
waterfowl (p=0.15).  33% (7/21) of seropositive flocks did not use pest control compared 
to 13% (2/15) that did (p=0.17).  Seropositive flocks that did not use pest control were 
2.5 times as likely to be AI seropositive than those that did.   35% (7/20) of seropositive 
flocks were from Northern Maryland while 13% (2/16) were from other regions (p=0.12).  
Seropositive birds from Northern Maryland were 3.8 times as likely to be AI seropositive 
than those from Southern or Eastern Maryland.   Five out of 11 flocks (46%) that were AI 




of AI seropositive flocks without diarrhea (p=0.08).  Results from statistical analysis may 
be found in Tables 16, 17, 18, and 19.   
   
Table 16   Univariate analysis of categorical biosecurity variables (P< 0.25).   
 





Diarrhea Reported within past 6 mo. 2.84 0.939-8.596 0.075 
Location North vs. other regions 2.80 0.672-11.670 0.122 
Pest 
control 
Implemented pest control 2.5 0.601-10.394 0.165 
Waterfowl Exposed to wild waterfowl 3.14 1.116-8.853 0.148 
Species Chicken only vs. mix 
species 
3.9 0.937-16.326 0.041 
  
Table 17   Simple logistic regression of continuous biosecurity variables   (P<0.25) 





Time owned How many years kept poultry 1.04 0.98-1.10 0.236 
Visit comm. How often visit commercial sites 1.08 0.88-1.32 0.223 
 
 
Table 18  Multivariate logistic regression  (P<0.25) 
 
Variable Description Coefficient P-value 
Time owned How many years kept poultry 0.613 0.133 
Visit comm. How often visit commercial sites 2.701 0.104 
Diarrhea Reported within past 6 mo. -1.314 0.380 
Location North vs. other regions 2.500 0.204 
Pest control Implemented pest control -0.107 0.942 
Waterfowl Exposed to wild waterfowl 18.377 0.736 
Species Chicken only vs. mix species 29.275 0.112 
 
 
Table 19  Backward selection stepwise logistic regression model to examine association 
between biosecurity risk factors and flock positives.  (P< 0.05) 
 
Variable Description Coefficient P-value 
Time owned How many years kept poultry 0.154 0.127 
Visit comm. How often visit commercial sites 0.713 0.080 
Location North vs. other regions 2.379 0.102 




Chapter 4: Discussion 
 
4.1  Principal Findings and Interpretations 
  
 This study confirmed that backyard flocks are no exceptions to infectious and 
zoonotic diseases and that Maryland flocks may have been introduced to AI from 
exposure to waterfowl.  Similar findings were also reported in a 2006 New Zealand study 
that identified five out of 24 flocks to be seropositive for AI (Zheng et al., 2006).  Nearly 
half of the surveyed premises kept their birds on free range, with some accessible to 
water sources such as ponds or rivers.  Over half of farms reported that their flocks could 
be exposed to wild birds, while less than half practice pest control management.  The lack 
of a secure housing environment and location near a congregation source for wild birds 
increases the likelihood of disease transmission from exposure to wild birds, waterfowl, 
and pests.  In this study, while not statistically significant, a higher proportion of AI 
seropositive flocks were found to be exposed to waterfowl and did not use pest control.  
Over half of the flocks were also exposed to wild birds. 
  These potential risk associations with disease reservoirs and vectors are 
consistent with findings from other studies.  For example, wild birds most frequently 
reported visiting poultry enclosures where sparrows and European starlings, both of 
which are susceptible to experimental highly pathogenic H5N1 infection and excrete high 
titers of virus (Boon et al., 2007).  Another study conducted in an artificial barnyard 
setting found that mallards recently infected with H5N2 and H7N3 could transmit the 
influenza A viruses to chickens, blackbirds, rats and pigeons making laboratory science 




pathogens, such as MG, have also been isolated from free ranging house finches and 
multiple other songbird species in the eastern U.S. and Canada.  These house finch MG 
isolates have been shown to cause  clinical infections in chickens and turkeys (O’Connor 
et al., 1999).   One study found that darkling beetles collected from commercial broiler 
flocks contained live ILT virus while a rodent had ILT DNA in its lungs, further 
indicating that pests may not only serve as fomites, externally carrying the viruses, but as 
vectors harboring the virus internally as well (Ou et al., 2012).    Pigeons and doves, 
along with waterfowl, have played a major role in the panzoonotic spread of Newcastle 
disease. Newcastle disease virus isolates, identical to strains identified in cormorant 
outbreaks, were discovered in free range turkeys from North Dakota (USAHA, 1993).   
These cases support the importance of isolating backyard flocks from other birds and 
pests that could be infected or carry diseases, especially during the summer months of 
migration when birds return to breeding grounds.   
 Of the 41 flocks surveyed, all but one allowed visitors onto their poultry premises, 
with almost 75% permitting direct contact with their flock. This increase in flock traffic 
potentially increases the risk of introducing disease via fomites as visitors' vehicles, 
boots, and clothing may carry pathogens.  Several outbreak investigations have linked 
fomites in connection with disease spread, such as the 1983 HPAI outbreak in 
commercial poultry which was associated with human and equipment traffic from New 
York live bird markets (Beard, 2000). Another study found an association between farms 
of the 1999 MG outbreak in North Carolina as a poultry grower returned to his flock after 
visiting an MG positive farm without changing his contaminated clothing or footwear 




before and after handling their birds (66%) admittedly never wore designated clothing.  
Majority of backyard flocks (68%) also reported being within a quarter mile (0.4km) of 
other backyard flocks.  One study designed a model to predict the potential wind-borne 
transmission of HPAI virus particles between farms given the conditions of the Dutch 
2003 HPAI epidemic.  These researchers estimated that 24% of the observed infections 
could be explained by wind-borne transmission up to 25km (15.5mi) (Ssematimba, 
2012).  Another case-control study determined that ILT case flocks were 9.9 times more 
likely to be located within the wind vector of a clinical ILT flock during the 14 day 
incubation period compared to control flocks (Johnson et al., 2005). While dependent on 
variable conditions, these findings indicate that backyard flocks could potentially bridge 
the gaps between farms during an outbreak, especially in a poultry-dense location.              
 Case analysis of the single ILT/MG positive flock revealed that the owner had 
kept poultry for 15 years, primarily to sell meat.  Flock size was 857 birds with a mix of 
chickens, turkeys, ducks, guinea fowl, and geese which were not separated by species or 
age.  MG was isolated from young turkeys and the ILT DNA was sequenced from a 
mature hen.  Birds were free range and exposed to wild birds, pets, rodents, and livestock.  
The owner visited commercial poultry locations while coming into direct contact with 
birds and allowed guests onto the premises, but restricted direct contact.   The owner had 
purchased new birds within the last year and did not isolate new birds from the flock.  
Within the last year, the owner reported 200 deaths (23%) from predation and 100 deaths 
(11%) from disease.  Only respiratory signs of disease were observed in the last six 
months.  The owner never washes hands before or after handling birds, never wears 




clean and disinfect equipment and practices pest control.   A Google® maps search for 
the term "poultry farm" was conducted and revealed one turkey farm with over 100,000 
birds within five miles (8km) of this flock. 
 Despite low to non-existent prevalence rates for the various pathogens of interest, 
serum analysis provided a further look into the history of flock exposure to diseases.  
While seroprevalence for ND could not be accurately differentiated between vaccination 
or field exposure status, some of the ILT and MG seropositives were distinguishable.  It 
is strongly believed that MG seropositives are a result of field strain challenges, as most 
hatcheries generally do not vaccinate flocks.  Instead, MG is controlled and eradicated 
through routine testing and biosecurity to maintain a NPIP MG clean status (USDA 
NPIP, 2006).  While only one flock owner reported vaccinating for ILT, no other 
backyard flock owners vaccinated birds once on their premises.  Owners often obtained 
birds from various sources and vaccination practices among hatcheries and growers vary 
on several factors including state regulations, personal preference, or age of the bird 
being purchased, therefore details for individual flocks could not be accurately 
determined.  Beyond these issues, antibody titers also depend on a variety of other factors 
such as dose of infection/vaccination, length of infection, virulence, age of bird, and route 
of infection/administration to name a few.  It is also possible that poultry with a 
serological response may no longer be shedding the organism, and equally so, 
seronegative poultry may be infected but with insufficient immunoglobulin 
concentrations.  
 The ProFLOK PLUS ELISA kit used in this study presents a titer profile response 




flock (Figure 20).  This vaccination program is generally used when disease is mild and 
sporadic in a region and follows a protocol similar to the OIE recommended guidelines:  
live Hitchner-B1 by conjunctival or spray administration at day one of age; live Hitchner-
B1 or La Sota at 18-21 days of age in drinking water; live La Sota in drinking water at 10 
weeks of age, and an inactivated oil emulsion vaccine at point of lay (OIE, 2009).  The 
mean titer from one NDV seropositive flock (7767, range: 3610-12738) was significantly 
higher (p=0.0025) than the mean titer of all other NDV seropositive flocks (4086, range: 
522-7890). However, it cannot be determined whether this represents a vaccine or field 
challenge response.    
 
 
Figure 20  Typical antibody profile in response to standard NDV vaccination program of 




 It is believed that all of the AI seropositive flocks identified in this study were 
exposed to LPAI viruses as the birds survived the infection and owners did not report any 




may produce subtle to no signs of clinical infection.  Almost one third of owners who 
were tested observed diarrhea in their flock within the past six months, which includes 
46% of AI exposed flocks.  One third of owners also reported a decrease in egg 
production or soft/misshapen eggs.  Of the AI seropositive flocks, only 33% reported this 
observation.  While 11% of sampled backyard flock owners recalled respiratory disease 
within the last six months, only one AI seropositive flock exhibited coughing, sneezing, 
nasal secretions, or swollen sinuses.  Weight loss or decreased appetite was also observed 
in 8% of tested flocks but none of the AI seropositive flocks.  Another indication that 
flocks were exposed to LPAI viruses was in the negative results of the HI assay for H5, 
H7, or H9 influenza subtypes.  Previous influenza surveillance studies conducted in wild 
Maryland waterfowl have reported the presence of hemagglutinin subtypes H2, H3, H6, 
H9, H11, and H12, while the majority of North American HA subtypes consist of H3, 
H4, and H6 (Slemons et al., 2003; Pascua et al., 2006; Hanson et al., 2003).  Figure 21 
displays a scatter plot of all the ELISA positive titers.  Bird titers from PCR positive 
flocks were identified to evaluate the potential titer distribution throughout a flock in 
response to an exposure.       
 A handful of studies from around the world have evaluated the seroprevalence of 
disease in non-vaccinated backyard flocks. While one study in New Zealand found 20.8% 
(5/24) AI flock seroprevalence, comparable with this study (23%), a Minnesota team only 
detected one flock out of 150 (0.66%) for AI antibodies (Zheng et al., 2010;  Yendell et 
al., 2012).  In Switzerland, researchers reported 37.5% (15/40) seroprevalence of AI in 
fancy breeding flocks.  This same study also determined seroprevalence for SE (3/40, 




higher prevalence rates overall comparatively to this study's findings (Wunderwald and 
Hoop, 2002).  California backyard flocks were found to have a MG seroprevalence of 
38% (12/32) (McBride et al., 1991), and another study in Argentina reported a MG 
seroprevalence of 33% (22/67) (Xavier et al., 2010).   
  












 ILT has been controlled in the U.S. historically by two live attenuated vaccines, 
those attenuated by multiple passages in embryonated eggs (CEO) and those passaged in 
tissue cultures (TCO).  However, isolates from ILT outbreaks demonstrate that attenuated 
vaccines, especially those of CEO, are capable of reverting to virulence and causing 
disease in naive birds.  In an effort to mitigate the spread of ILT in non-commercial 
poultry, the MDA in 2009 mandated new policies restricting the use of CEO vaccine in 
exhibition poultry, with the recommendation of TCO vaccines.  This study showed that 
while CEO vaccines are still circulating in backyard flocks, TCO vaccines were the 
predominant (8/10) ILT isolates detected from poultry flocks.    Of the 19 ILT 
seropositive flocks, three can be attributed to TCO vaccine, and two to CEO vaccines.  
Reemergence of MG has been a concern over recent years thought to be a result of 
locating large poultry populations within a limited area and under poor biosecurity.  
However, this study reported a much lower seroprevalence in backyard poultry compared 
to other serological surveys.  Of the five seropositive premises, one flock was positive for 
current infection with the S6 strain of MG, an infectious strain first isolated in 1954 from 
the brain of a turkey in a California flock (Zander, 1961).   
Concern remains with the fact that almost a quarter of backyard flocks were 
seropositive for AI, however, some reassurance follows with the absence of H5, H7, and 
H9 subtypes.  It is evident based on the findings of this study that biosecurity education 
in non-commercial flocks should be promoted and is a necessary step towards disease 





4.3 Strengths and Limitations 
 
 This is the first known study to report associations between biosecurity 
management practices and disease prevalence/seroprevalence of these five major 
pathogens of interest among backyard flocks located within close proximity to the 
Delmarva commercial poultry region.   Flock positives were also sequenced and strain 
differentiated.  However, this study was subject to some limitations.  The overall 
response rate of this study (4.1%) was relatively poor, but believed to stem from the 
concern over the mandatory reporting of flock positives to the State Veterinarian and 
potential repercussions, such as "Hold Orders" that restrict the movement of birds onto or 
off the premises, as well as the stigma attached to having an infectious disease.  A larger 
sample size may have also increased the ability of this study to detect significant 
associations between biosecurity risk factors and disease prevalence. While association 
could be hypothesized based on proportional analysis, wide confidence intervals indicate 
that these estimates have low precision from an inadequate sample size. While methods 
of convenience sampling are often assumed to be representative of a population, 
sampling biases (most notably selection bias) do occur, making it difficult to develop 
statistically valid estimates of disease prevalence, regardless of how many birds are 
sampled.  This study was also limited to a population of backyard flock owners that had 
registered with the MDA.  It is believed that disease prevalence estimates are lower than 
those occurring in the true population as most owners with clinically ill birds would be 




Chapter 5:  Summary and Conclusion 
 
  
5.1  Meeting the Objectives 
  
 Surveillance is a dynamic process that requires the continuous observation, 
collection, and analysis of data in order to identify the presence of a disease and contain 
its spread. While wild waterfowl has been the main target of disease investigations, 
domesticated poultry warrant consideration as well, particularly with its growing trend. 
This study aimed to capture a snap shot of pathogen prevalence during an outbreak-free  
period in order to provide information on the background level of disease in this 
potentially vulnerable population and to develop a better understanding of its molecular 
epidemiology.  Maryland small flock exposure history was also analyzed and interpreted 
to the best of the researcher’s ability to evaluate a broader range of exposure and 
transmission pathways.  
 The goals of this study were successfully implemented and completed as 
surveillance data from this project provided a better understanding of biosecurity and 
pathogen transmission relationships within backyard flocks, particularly of those exposed 
to avian influenza. The first objective led to the characterization of Maryland backyard 
flock biosecurity practices, identifying the strengths and weaknesses among flock 
owners.   Sampling, laboratory analysis, and partial genome sequencing resulted in the 
identification and differentiation of positive flocks.   Ten flocks were found to be positive 
for ILTV.  Eight were identified as TCO isolates, one was an identical match for the CEO 
LT BLEN® vaccine known to revert to virulence, and another was a CEO like strain 




currently infected with the S6 strain of MG.  Multiple flocks were found to be exposed or 
vaccinated for ND, ILT, and MG.  Nine flocks were AI seropositive, most likely from 
exposure to LPAI as subtypes H5, H7, nor H9 were not detected. While no risk factors 
were identified as statistically significant after multivariate logistic regression, 
proportional observations were analyzed and reported with strengths of association as 
addressed in the remaining five objectives, furthering the knowledge of disease 
prevalence in a population subjected to few inspections.  Disease surveillance will always 
remain a necessity and will further improve disease management programs alongside 
with prevention and education strategies.             
        
5.2 Online Biosecurity Education 
 
 In addition to the surveillance study, online Extension Moodle™ courses on avian 
influenza and biosecurity were developed for audiences including backyard flocks 
owners, youth and 4-H members, as well as emergency responders. These self-directed 
certification courses provide information consolidated from multiple government 
organizations on avian influenza and how it may affect backyard flocks, as well as details 
on prevention, response, and recovery.  Since the launch of the Backyard Flock course, 
almost 100 registered users from all over the world including HPAI affected countries 
such as Egypt, Indonesia, and Iraq have participated.  Course impact has been evaluated 
showing user’s knowledge on avian influenza and biosecurity before and after 
completing the course had increased from 13% to 61%.  On a scale of one to five, users 
rated ease of use as 4.5, information clarity as 4.6, content level appropriate 4.5, and 




practices after taking the course.  Supplemental to the courses is a virtual hands on 
backyard flock designed to test participants’ knowledge on biosecurity using an avatar in 
Second Life©.    
 As demonstrated in this study, education is essential for backyard flock ownership 
as the majority of flock owners sampled had kept poultry for five years or less. Many 
flocks did not practice “good” biosecurity, as previously described, many of which are 
simple, practical, and affordable.   Biosecurity factors associated with disease prevalence 
identified in this study will be highlighted in the biosecurity courses, such as protecting 
birds from wild birds and waterfowl, particularly during the spring and summer months 
when migration season is at its peak and implementing pest control.    Education 
programs, such as these, provide a large impact and are more cost effective than 
surveillance as they aim to prevent disease closer to the source.    
 
Extension educational sources may be found below: 
Backyard Flocks:  http://campus.extension.org/course/view.php?id=423 
Youth and 4-H:  http://campus.extension.org/course/view.php?id=285 






















Project Title:  Epidemiological Analysis of Biosecurity Practices and Associated               
Prevalence of Diseases in Non-commercial Poultry Flocks 
 
Why is this research being done? 
Poultry disease can have a detrimental effect on the health of flock.  However, using appropriate 
biosecurity practices, practices used to prevent the introduction and spread of diseases into a flock, can 
greatly reduce the incidence of infected birds.  No previous information on the uses of these practices in 
correlation with disease in backyard flocks of Maryland has been published.  Dr. Nathaniel Tablante and 
Mrs. Jenny Madsen would like to invite you to participate in this research study if you own chickens, 
turkeys, ducks, geese, quail, or pheasants.   
 
What are you looking for? 
• Avian Influenza 
• Infectious Laryngotracheitis 
• Newcastle Disease Virus 
• Salmonella Enteritidis 
• Mycoplasma gallisepticum 
To find out more about these diseases please visit:  http://partnersah.vet.cornell.edu/avian-atlas/lists/disease 
and http://www.cdc.gov/nczved/divisions/dfbmd/diseases/Salmonella _enteritidis/ 
 
What will I be asked to do? 
It is entirely your choice as to whether you wish to take part in the study.  You may withdraw from the 
study at any time.  Participants will be asked to: 
• Complete a biosecurity survey  (You may chose to only complete the survey) 
• Allow trained researchers to take tracheal/cloacal swab samples and drag swabs from backyard 
flocks 
• Allow trained researchers to take blood samples from backyard flocks 
 
How long will it take? 
The survey and sample collection will begin in June 2011 and continue till September 2011.   
• The survey should take no more than 30 minutes.  You may complete the survey online at 
http://www.kwiksurveys.com/online-survey.php?surveyID=NKEDLJ_ba2f8673 
• If owners allow sampling (blood, tracheal, and cloacal) on their birds, collection times would be 
obtained at a time of their choosing.  Sampling time will vary on how many birds are to be 
sampled; however, one bird will take no longer than approximately 10 minutes.  Only one visit 
will be made per location for sample collections.  
 
What are the benefits of this research? 
• Owners will obtain a free diagnostic health status report on their backyard poultry.    
Surveillance Research: 
Researchers from the Veterinary Medical Sciences Department at the University of Maryland – College Park 
are undertaking a research project to determine biosecurity practices and prevalence of poultry diseases in 
backyard flocks located on the Delmarva Peninsula and surrounding areas.  If you are interested in 
participating please read, initial, date, and sign this information/consent form and return in the self addressed 




• Owners will have access to specialists who can answer questions about the animal and human 
health aspects of the different pathogens.   
• If a disease is detected early it may help prevent of the further spread to the rest of the flock.  
Participating in this study will also help the owner determine if the biosecurity practices they are 
using are effective at preventing disease.   
• Owners will also be given free access to online biosecurity courses for avian influenza.    
 
What are the risks of this research? 
Subjects will be exposed to no or minimal risk by participating in the survey.  No physical or invasive 
procedures will be conducted on human subjects.  While extremely unlikely, if birds are found to have 
these reportable diseases, with the exception of mycoplasma gallisepticum, the state veterinarian will be 
notified within 48 hours of identifying the pathogen.  Any findings will be explained to participants. The 
state veterinarian will discuss the situation and may arrange to visit the property. A follow up investigation 
may be required to confirm findings.  
 
How is my privacy maintained? 
All personal information collected will be kept strictly confidential and will be locked in files and in 
password-protected computers.   Data on each individual will remain anonymous, unless a reportable 
disease is present in which case is notifiable to the state veterinarian by Maryland State law.  Contact 
information will be given out for no other reason.   Information will only used for research studies at the 
University of Maryland.   
 
Further Questions:   
This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for 
research involving human subjects.  If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, please 
contact: 
Institutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 
Email:  irb@umd.edu    Phone:   301-405-0678 
 
You may contact the researchers at any time if you have any questions about participating. 
VMSC Dept.  c/o Jenny Madsen   8075 Greenmead Dr., College Park, MD 20742 
Principal Investigator 
Dr. Nathaniel Tablante   Email:  nlt@umd.edu          Phone:   301-314-6810 
Field Investigator 
Jenny Madsen   Email: jmadsen@umd.edu         Phone:   410-926-5263 
 
Statement of Age of 
Subject and Consent 
 
Your signature indicates that you are at least 18 years of age;, 
the research has been explained to you; your questions have been fully 
answered; and you freely and voluntarily choose to participate in this 
research project. 
Signature and Date 
 
NAME OF SUBJECT 
 
 







Appendix B:   
BACKYARD FLOCK BIOSECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Virginia-Maryland Regional College of Veterinary Medicine 
 
Thank you for taking the time to fill out the survey, a graduate student appreciates it.  Please 
complete the backyard biosecurity survey and return it in the self addressed prepaid envelope.  





Name:              _________________________ 
 













(choose only one) 
1. SALE-live birds 
2. SALE-meat 
3. SALE-eggs 
4. FOR EGGS-home consumption 
5. SHOWS/EXHIBITIONS 
6. PETS 
Type of Housing 
(choose only one) 
 
1. Coup, fenced in and 
covered 
2. Coup, fenced in but not 
covered 
3. Free range over property 
4. Free range, having access 
to ponds or streams. 
Chickens    
Turkeys     
Ducks    
Geese    
Pheasants    
Quail    
Chuckers    
Pigeons    
Other (please 
specify) 
   
Address:    ______________________ 
                        




2.  How long have you kept backyard poultry?       
 
3. Do you separate your birds by species?  YES 
NO 
         
         
4. Do you separate your birds by age?  
 
              YES 
                     NO 
          
          
 
 
5. Where did you get your birds?     (Please check all that apply and specify the name of the 
source). 
MAIL ORDER HATCHERY 
  
AUCTION MARKET  
  
COMMERCIAL FARM  
  





6. Please check yes or no about you and your birds contact with: 
 You: Poultry have contact with: 
Wild Waterfowl: 









Other Wild Birds: 



















































































7. How many commercial poultry flocks are within 1/4 mile 
from your flock?  
 
 




9. Do you or anyone in your household work in the poultry 






10. In the average year how many times do you or anyone in your 
household visit commercial poultry premises?  
 
 
If >0, do the visitors come in contact with the birds (e.g. 






11. In the average year how many times do you or anyone in your 
household visit backyard poultry premises? 
 
If >0, do the visitors come in contact with the birds (e.g. 






12. Do you allow business visitors (vet, extension agent, 





If  yes, do the visitors come in contact with the birds (e.g. 






13. Do you allow non-business visitors (school groups, friends, 






If  yes, do the visitors come in contact with the birds (e.g. 






14.    Do you SELL birds in live bird auction markets?                                        YES 
                                     NO 
 
 
15.    Do you BUY birds from live bird auction markets?  
 
                                      YES 
                                      NO 
 
 
16.   Have you purchased new birds in the past 12 months? 
 
                                      YES 
                                      NO 
 
 
18. Do you isolate new birds before introducing them to your    flock? 
                    If YES, for how long?        
____________________________ 
                                      YES 


















19. Once the birds are on your premises do you vaccinate 
your birds for any diseases? 
 












Other causes (unknown)?  
21. Please check all the signs of disease that you have seen in your birds within the past 6 
months. 
Diarrhea        
Respiratory signs  
(cough/sneeze, nasal secretions, swollen sinuses) 
 
Neurological 
(lack of coordination, weakness) 
 
Weight loss/ decreased appetite  
Decreased egg production or soft/misshapen eggs  
Swelling 




22. Please list any medications you administered to the 
birds within the last 6 months. 
 
23. Have you ever sent any ILL birds to the diagnostic lab 
for disease diagnosis or had a vet exam? 
 











24. How often do you wash your hands before and after 
handling your birds? 
Always 
Sometimes 















ONCE A YEAR     




26. Do you routinely use a footbath at the entrance to your 
poultry premises?  
 
 If NO, do you wear a different pair of shoes when entering your 
poultry area? 










27. How often do you make visitors wash their hands before 
and after handling your birds? 
Don’t allow visitors 
Always 
Sometimes 





28. How often do you make visitors wear separate clothing 
and/or shoes? 
Don’t allow visitors 
Always 
Sometimes 





29. Do you clean and disinfect birdcages, floors, and equipment?                                        
YES 




        If YES, how often?  
 
 
MORE THAN ONCE A WEEK  
ONCE A WEEK  
ONCE A MONTH  




If YES, how do you dispose of used litter or 
bedding between clean-outs?  
 
 
MANURE SHED OR COMPOSTER  
OUTDOOR MANURE PILE  
SPREAD ON FIELD AT THIS LOCATION   
HAULED AWAY  
31. How do you dispose of dead birds?  
 
Please check all that apply. 
COMPOSTED  
LANDFILL / TRASH  
BURIED  
TAKEN BY PREDATORS  
HAULED AWAY  






33. Would you like to receive educational materials on 





   
 
34. Would you be interested in participating in the 
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